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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

INTERMOUNTAIN ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN
'
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

No.
10760

F. C. WATTERSON et al,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The case which is the subject matter of this Appeal
involves an action in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, Utah, by the plaintiff and respondent, Intermountain Association of Credit Men, against the defendant and appellant, F. C. Watterson and his sonin-law, Rolfe Griffiths, to recover the balance purportedly due from the Silver Creek General Store in Picabo,
1

Idaho, to both Salt Lake Hardware Company and to
Barwick and Company for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered to the Silver Creek General
Store by said companies, and, which claims were assigned by said companies to the Intermountain Association of Credit Men.
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The case was tried in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, Utah, before the Honorable Joseph G.
Jeppson, District Judge, sitting without a jury on
September 23, 1966. Judge Jeppson ruled that there
was a partnership relationship between defendants
Rolfe Griffiths and his father-in-law, defendant, F. C.
'Vatterson, and, granted Judgment in favor of plaintiff
and against defendant, F. C. Watterson. It is from
this Judgment defendant F. C. Watterson appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant F. C. Watterson seeks reversal of the Judgment against him and for Judgment
in his favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the outset it should be pointed out that the
designation in the Complaint of defendants Rolfe Griffiths and F. C. Watters as former partners doing
business as the Silver Creek General Store is a misnomer
2

and completely misleading. This was one of the issues
for the District Court to determine. They never were
partners. Defendant Watterson only aided and assisted
his daughter and son-in-law in the operation of the
Silver Creek General Store as any loving, considerate
parent would normally do.
Defendant Rolfe Griffiths is the husband of l\1ae
Griffiths, who is the daughter of defendant F. C.
W' atterson. In the spring of 1960 Rolfe Griffiths and
his wife, Mae Griffiths, took over and started operating
the Silver Creek General Store in Picabo, Idaho. (R.
79). To enable them to get going in the business Rolfe
and :Mae Griffiths borrowed some cash and some bonds
from defendant F. C. 'Vatterson, their father and
father-in-law. (R. 81). They, the Griffiths, operated
the store for about a year. During the first six or seven
months the 'Vattersons assisted them somewhat for
which assistance Watterson was paid approximately
$400.00 per month in merchandise. (R. llO). Arrangements were made to have F. C. Watterson sign the
store checks since Rolfe Griffiths was away from the
store part of the time. (R. 91). However, in 1960,
F. C. Watterson and his wife left the State of Idaho
and returned to Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 107, 144,
172 & 193). Rolfe Griffiths and his wife, Mae Griffiths,
continued to operate the store until about May of 1961.
(R. 172).
The Silver Creek General Store got into financial
difficulties. As a consequence of these financial diffi-
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culties, in 1961, both Salt Lake Hardware Company
and Barwick and Company sued defendants Rolfe
Griffiths and F. C. Watterson in the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of
Idaho in and for Blaine County designating them in
those actions as co-partners doing business under the
name and style of Silver Creek General Store. In those
actions Salt Lake Hardware obtained Judgment against
them on August 22, 1961, and, Barwick and Company
obtained Judgment against them on September 1, 1961.
The claims of these two companies were assigned to
Intermountain Association of Credit Men, who, on
May 9, 1962, filed an action against these defendants
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, in a
case entitled: Intermountain Association of Credit
Men, Plaintiff, vs. Rolfe Griffiths and F. C. Watterson,
f I dlbl a Silver Creek General Store, Defendants. Civil
No. 136508. (Exhibit 11) .
While the proceedings in Civil No. 136508 (Exhibit 11 ) in the District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah, were still pending, and, approximately a year
and one-half after the filing of that case, the Inter·
mountain Association of Credit l\Ien filed another law
suit against these same defendants, this cause, Civil
No. 145459, in the District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah, which cause is the subject matter of this Appeal.
Since two cases involving the very same relief were
pending at the same time against these defendants,
Motions to dismiss Civil No. 136508 (Exhibit 11) were
made by both plaintiff and defendants, and, on March
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J. Anderson made and entered
an Order dismissing Civil No. 136508 as to defendant
R. C. 'i\T atterson, with prejudice. (Exhibit 11).
27, 1964, Judge Aldon

Subsequently, at the Pretrial of the case which
is the subject matter of this Appeal, Civil No. 145459,
Judge Stewart l\I. Hanson took under advisement defendant F. C. \Vatterson's l\Iotion to dismiss Civil No.
145459, on the grounds of res judicata, since Civil No.
136508 had previously been dismissed with prejudice
on March 27, 1964. (R. 12 & 13). Then on December
13, 1965, Judge Stewart M. Hanson made and entered
his "Findings, Conclusions and Judgment" granting
defendant F. C. \Vatterson Judgment in his favor
against plaintiff, dismissing the said cause in Civil No.
145459 with prejudice as to defendant F. C. 'Vatterson. (R. 14 & 15). On a .Motion for a New Trial and
in a Memorandum Decision dated January 20, 1966,
Judge Hanson set aside the Judgment of December
13, 1965, and, the case which is the subject matter of
this Appeal, Civil No. 145459, ·was set for Trial and
thereafter tried before the Honorable Joseph G. J eppson, District Judge, without a jury on September 23,
1966.

During the trial of this cause which is the subject
matter of this Appeal and after plaintiff had rested,
<lefeudant F. C. 'Va tterson made a l\Iotion to dismiss
the cause against him on the following grounds: (a)
The Complaint failed to state a cause of action against
him; (b) The matter was res judicata for the reason
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the plaintiff previously filed an action in Civil No.
136508 (Exhibit 11) against him involving the same
parties and the same accounts which was heard by the
Court and dismissed with prejudice; and, (c) That
there was not clear and convincing evidence to establish a partnership upon which the Court could grant
a Judgment against defendant F. C. Watterson. (R.
76). Judge Jeppson denied this Motion.
Finally and at the conclusion of the Trial and after
both parties had rested their cases and submitted and
argued the matter, Judge Jeppson ruled that there was
a partnership between defendants Rolfe Griffiths and
his father-in-law, defendant F. C. \Vatterson, and,
granted Judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant F. C. Watterson.
Defendant-appellant F. C. 'Vatterson makes his
Appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah and in connection therewith seeks reversal of the Judgment against
him and for Judgment in his favor.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE CASE SHOULD HA VE
BEEN DISMISSED AGAINST DEFENDANT
F. C. WATTERSON ON THE GROUNDS OF
"RES JUDICATA".
The only basis upon which Judgment legally could
be rendered against defendant-appellant F. C. "Tatterson is that either there was an actual partnership or
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a partnership by estoppel existing between F. C.,Vatterson and his son-in-law, defendant Rolfe Griffiths,
in connection with the operation of the Silver Creel~
General Store in Picabo, Idaho.
Assuming that there was such a relationship, the
case against defendant F. C. \Vatterson, which is the
subject matter of this Appeal, should have been dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff's assignors, Salt Lake Hardware CoriIpany and Barwick and Company, had already sued
said defendants Rolfe Griffiths and }'. C. 'Vatterson
in the State of Idaho and obtained Judgments against
them. Their claims, arising out of the operation of the
Silver Creek General Store, were assigned to the Intermountain Association of Credit Men, the plaintiffrespondent herein. That company thereupon filed an
action against both of said defendants in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, in Civil No. 136508
(Exhibit 11). That action, involving the claims of Salt
Lake Hardware Company and Barwick and Company,
was dismissed as to defendant-appellant F. C. Y\T atterson, with prejudice, on :March 27, 1964. (Exhibit 11).
The doctrine of "res judicata" is a universal doctrine recognized by all jurisdictions. It is based on
the fundamental proposition that a party •who has
litigated or who has had an opportunit;y to litigate a
rnatter should not be permitted to litigate it again to
the harrassment or vexation of his opponent. This
doctrine is adhered to by the decisions in this jurisdic-
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tion which prohibit the "splitting" of a cause of action.
It is expressly recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure which provide in part in Rule 8 (a) as follows:
" . . . Relief in the alternative or of several
different types may be demanded."
The reasons and rationale which underlie this pervading rule of law are wel1 set forth in 30A Am. Jur.,
Judgments, Sec. 376, p. 373, as follows:
" ... Public policy and the interest of litigants
alike require that there be an end to litigation
which, without the doctrine of res judicata would
be endless. The doctrine of res judicata rests
upon the ground that the party to be affected,
or some other with whom he is in privity, has
litigated, or had an opportuunity to litigate, the
same matter in a former action in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harrassment and
vexation of his opponent. The doctrine of res
judicata not only puts an end to strife, but produces certainty as to individual rights and gives
dignity and respect to judicial proceedings."
(Emphasis supplied) .
The parties and cause of action set forth in Civil
No. 136508 and Civil No. 145459 in the District Court
of Salt Lake County, Utah, against defendants Rolfe
Griffiths and F. C. 'Vatterson were the same. In each
instance the claims arose out of the operation of the
Silver Creek General Store in Picabo, Idaho, by the
said defendants as partners or as partners by estoppel
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according to the allegations of plaintiff m the Complaints which it filed.
The doctrine of "res j udicata" prohibits one fron:;_
maintaining successive suits against the same defendant on different theories of relief. As set forth in
Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed. Sec. 684, pp. 1443-H:
" ... The application of the doctrine of res
judicata to identical causes of action does not
depend upon the identity or differences of the
forms of the two actions. A Judgment upon
the merit bars a subsequent suit upon the same
cause, though brought in a different form of
action, and a party therefore cannot, by varying
the form of action or adopting a different method
of presenting his care, escape the principle that
one and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated."
In Civil No. 136580 plaintiff-respondent did have
an opportunity to litigate the claims of Salt Lake Hardware Company and Banvick and Company which had
been assigned to it on any possible theory it wanted
to present, including the theory it subsequently set
forth in Civil No. 145459, the subject matter of this
Appeal. Having chosen not to amend its complaint in
Civil No. 136580, but, having chosen voluntarily to
file an entirely new action almost a year and one half
later in Civil No. H5459, it is bound by the doctrine
of "res judicata" and the ruling made by the District
Court on :March 27, 1961<, in Civil No. 136580, which
ruling it chose not to appeal.
9

In applying the doctrine of "res judicata" it is
sometimes proper to presume a judgment to have been
rendered on the merits in the absence of words of qualification. See in this connection 30A Am. J ur., J udgments, Sec. 469, p. 511, wherein it is said:
" . . . In some cases it is held proper to presume a judgment to have been rendered upon
the merits where it is unaccompanied by words
of qualification such as "without prejudice," or
other terms indicating a right or privilege to
take further legal proceedings on the subject."
However, it is conclusive and needs no presumption
at all where the judgment of dismissal is "with prejudice" as was the case in the Order in Civil No. 136508.
(Exhibit 11) . This is particularly so when viewed in
light of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which were
in force and applicable at the time. When the Order
of dismissal with prejudice was made and entered in
Civil No. 136508 on March 27, 1964, Rule 41 (b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provided in the
part particularly applicable to the situation before this
Court as follows :

" . . . a dismissal under this subdivision and
any dismis.sal not provided for in this rule, other
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue, operates as an adjudication upon the merits." (Emphasis supplied).
Subsequently, both the District Court and the Supreme
Court of Utah amended Rule 41 (b) to be effective
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October 1, 1965, so as to make the applicable portion
of that Rule read as follows:
" . . . a dismissal under this subdivision and
any dism~ssal not provided for in this rule, other
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable
party, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits."
The case which plaintiff-respondent filed against
defendant appellant F. C. \Vatterson in Civil No. 13C~508 was not dismissed with prejudice for "lack of jurisdiction'', for "improper venue" or, for "lack of an indispensable party". Accordingly, in light of Rule 41
(b) as it read previously and as it recently has been
amended to read by the District Court and by the
Supreme Court of Utah, the dismissal with prejudice
of Civil No. 136508 was "an adjudication upon the
merits". Further action by plaintiff in Civil No. 145459,
the subject matter of this Appeal, was and is precluded
by the doctrine of "res judicata".
As set forth in 30A Am. J ur., Judgments, Sec.
363:
" ... The phase of the doctrine of res judicata
precluding subsequent litigati~n . of the. sa~ne
cause of action is much broader m its apphcat10n
than a determination of the questions involved
in the prior action; the conclusiveness of the
fudgment in such case etdends not only to matters actually determined, but also to other 1~at~
ters which could properly have been determznea
in the prior action. ( Olwell vs. Hopkins, 28 Cal.
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2d 147, 168 P2d 972; Colburn vs. Goodall, 72
Cal. ~98, 14 .P. 19~>): 1 1his rule applies to every
question f allzng within the purview of the original action, in respect to matters of both claim
and def e~e which .c?uld have been P!esented by
the exercise of diligence. There is authority
that even where the causes of action are different
the prior determination of litigated issues is con~
~lusiv:e in a subsequent suit not only as to the
issue itself, but also as to every matter that might
have been urged for or against that issue in its
determination . . . " (Emphasis supplied).
The rulings by the Supreme Court of Utah are
entirely consistent with the foregoing general law and
judicial decisions. The District Court of Salt Lake
County should have dismissed the action which is the
subject matter of this Appeal against defendant-appellant F. C. Watterson. See in this connection the following: Dorsett vs. Morse, ______ Utah ______ , 103 Pac. 969;
Glen Allen Mining Co. vs. Park Galena, 77 Utah 362,
296 Pac. 321; East Mill Creek Water Co. vs. Salt Lake
City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P2d 863; and, Ray vs. Consolidated Freightways, 4 Utah 2d 137, 289 P2d 196.
POINT II. THERE IS NO CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
OF A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN ROLFE
GRIFFITHS AND F. C. 'i\TATTERSON IN
THE OPERATION OF THE SILVER CREEK
GENERAL STORE UPON WHICH THE
COURT COULD GRANT A JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT F. C.
WATTERSON.

12

The Court's attention is respectfully invited to
the Findings of Fact upon which the Judgment against
defendant-appellant F. C. Watterson is bas~d. The
only finding made as to either an "actual" partnership
or a partnership by estoppel is that set forth in Finding
of Fact No. 1, reading as follows:
"That there was a partnership between the
Defendant F. C. Watterson and Rolfe Griffiths,
doing business as Silver Creek General Store,
at all times referred to in Plaintiff's Complaint".
It is respectfully submitted that this is not a "finding
of fact" but merely a "conclusion of law" not based
on any recited facts. Apparently the reason no facts
were recited is that there are no facts constituting clear
and convincing evidence upon which the legal conclusion of a partnership could be based.
It is interesting to observe in this connection that
apparently counsel for plaintiff-respondent also recognized that there were no such facts. In his concluding
argument to the District Court (not reported) he very
strongly and almost exclusively urged that even if the
facts did not show an actual partnership between Rolfe
Griffiths and F. C. Watterson, Judgment nevertheless
should be granted in favor of plaintiff and against
F. C. Watterson on the basis of a partnership by estoppel. A partnership by estoppel could not be relied
upon, however, because in the first place it was not
pleaded. Furthermore, defendant F. C. Watterson
specifically denied that there was a partnership. (R.
10).
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'Vith reference to the matter of a partnership by
estoppel it is set forth in 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, Sec. 153
( 1), Necessity for Pleading, at page 7 43, that:
"Estoppel. 01:dina~ily must be specially pleaded, whether it is relied on as a defense or as an
element of a cause of action."
See also the rulings of this Court in the following cases:
Campbell vs. Nunn, 78 Utah 316, 2 P2d 899; Tracy
Loan & Trust Co. vs. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah
509, 132 P2d 388; Lagoon Co. vs. Utah State Fair
Ass'n., 117 Utah 213, 214 P2d 614; and, Collett vs.
Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231 P2d 730.
As to the evidence in the record concerning any
actual partnership between Rolfe Griffiths and F. C.
'V atterson, both Rolfe Griffiths and F. C. Watterson
denied that there was such a partnership. (R. 81, 9~,
96 and 104). Mae Griffiths and Mae Waterson, the
"\Vives of the respective defendants, also denied that
there was such a partnership. (R. 142, 143, 200, 201
and 202).
The strongest evidence in the record as to a purported actual partnership between Rolfe Griffiths and
F. C. Watterson is the testimony of J. Heber Reese,
the Treasurer of Salt Lake Hardware Company. His
actual testimony and the other evidence in the record
belies the claim that there ever was a partnership or
that the question of a partnership relationship was ever
relied upon in the extension of credit.
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Mr. Reese testified that there was a meeting in the
Salt Lake Hardware store in early 1960 when purportedly Mr. Watterson, his son-in-law, Rolfe Griffiths,
and his daughter, came in to talk to them and make
arrangements for credit at the store. ( R. 33). He testified further that he extended credit to the Silver Creek
General Store for and on behalf of Salt Lake Hardware based almost entirely upon the financial information furnished at that meeting and which he set down
in his own handwriting in a document entitled "Credit
Interview". (Exhibit I) . His testimony with reference
to this as set forth in the Transcript at page 26 (R.
55) is as follows:
Q. Can you tell us whose decision whether or

not credit is extended?

A. Mine.
Q. In this case you did decide to have the company extend credit, in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. What facts did you rely on in making this
decision?
A. Almost entirely upon the financial information (which) was furf!ished to us.
Shortly after this testimony there was a five minute
recess. During the recess Mr. Henriksen, one of the
attorneys for plaintiff-respondent, discussed this testimony with him, and, when the Court reconvened, Mr.
Reese then testified as follows: (See Transcript 28, 29

-R. 57, 58).
15

Q. Mr. Reese, I asked you upon what information you relied, you indicated the financial
information receiyed. and I asked you if you
would list for us, or itemize for us· the inf ormation you referred to.
l\1R. HENRII\:SEN (should be l\1R. ALSTON): I object as repetitious.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
Q. (MR. l\1UHDOCK) : ·lvould you answer
the question?

A. \Vhat was the question?
Q. If you would list for us the information you
are referring to w horn you said you relied
upon it.
THE COURT: \Vhat you relied on to extend
credit.
A. The credit extension was given based upon
the financial statement that I had made out
by hand, plus the confirmation from Dun
& Bradstreet, this was a partnership, which
we cleared on each new account we open,
plus, I think we tried to clear with Intermountain 's report, but they did not have one.
It was based upon the financial staternents
given us, and the confirmation frorn Dun q;
Bradstreet that (it) 7J.:as a partnership.
(Emphasis supplied).
F. C. Watterson denied that he was ever at that
meeting as did his wife, l\Iae \Vatterson, and, so did
Rolfe Griffiths and his wife, l\Iae Griffiths. (R. 80,
86, 100, 103, 121, 139, 172, 183 and 192).
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The assets referred to in the financial statement
which was testified to by Mr. Reese are solely those
assets belonging to Rolfe Griffiths and Mae Griffiths,
his wife, except an item of $1,600.00 in bonds and an
item of $3,000.00 in cash, which said items it is uncontradicted were loaned to Rolfe Griffiths and Mae
Griffiths by their father-in-law and father, defendantappellant F. C. Watterson.
In connection with the aforesaid testimony of Mr.
Reese, the Court's attention is specifically invited to
the following: On the "Financial Statement," which is
on the reverse of Exihbit 1, appears the following:
"For the purpose of obtaining merchandise
from you on credit, I (we) make the fallowing
statement in writing, intending that you should
rely thereon respecting my (our) financial condition as of (Date) ... 3-21-1960." (Emphasis
supplied).
Rolfe Griffiths signed that statement but it was
not signed by F. C. Watterson. Now if Mr. Watterson
was in fact present at the meeting in question, surely
l\fr. Reese would have had him sign it. Furthermore,
if there was any ambiguity at all about the statement
it should be most strictly construed against Salt Lake
Hardware and the plaintiff-respondent herein because
it was the statement set forth on the form supplied
by that company and filled out in the handwriting
of its Treasurer, who had the responsibility of and
the authority for extending credit. The said financial
statement cannot be construed as the financial state-
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ment of llolfe Griffiths and F. C. 'V atterson under
the circumstances because it was signed only by Rolfe
Griffiths and recites unequivocally that "I (we) make
the following statement in writing, intending that you
should rely thereon respecting my (our) financial condition . . . . " (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's attention is also respectfully invite<l
to the further testimony of l\lr. Reese that the extension
of credit to the Silver Creek General Store was based
"upon the financial statements given us, and the confirmation f ram Dun & Bradstreet that (it) was a partnership." (Emphasis supplied). (R. 57 and 58). \Vith
reference to the Dun & Bradstreet Report (Exhibit
3), it was admitted in evidence over the objection of
defendant-appellant 'Vatterson made at the time as
follows: (See Transcript 42 and R. 71) :
l\1R. ALSTON: "\Ve, for the record, object,
on the grounds it is hearsay. That is data they
have not shown this defendant had knowledge
of having been sent out, that the original document was furnished with his signature on it,
or had any anthorization for the use of this defendant's signature. And we do not even know
from this defendant (witness) whether in fact
it was an actual signature or facsimile signature."
Even though the Dun & Bradstreet Report was
e;Toneously admitted in evidence as against defendantappellant F. C. 'Vatterson, the most significant part
about this evidence is that it was not furnished Salt
Lake Hardware Company for more than fifteen months
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after the meeting of March 21, 1960, referred to in
Exhibit 1, and the testimony of Mr. Reese relating
thereto, more than a year after the Silver Creek General
Store had folded up, and, more than eight months after
the Wattersons had already left the State of Idaho and
returned to Salt Lake City, Utah. The testimony of
Verne C. Thacker, District Service Manager for Dun
& Bradstreet, who was called as plaintiff's witness for
the purpose of testifying about and identifying the
said report, as set forth on page 43 of the Transcript
(R. 72) , is as follows:
Q. Mr. Thacker, I believe you said copy of that
report would have gone to Salt Lake Hardware June, 1961?

A. Yes.
Q. '-'T ould this be the first report they would
have received?
A. This is the only record I have requesting a
credit report.
Q. June 14, 1961?

A. June 14-let me check that. June 14, 1961.
(Emphasis supplied).
In writing about the account of Silver Creek General Store with Salt Lake IIardware the letters from
Salt Lake Hardware were never addressed to F. C.
Watterson, but only to Rolfe Griffiths. See Exhibits
12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17.
·
Also, even though the operation of the Silver
Creek General Store was discussed on many occasions
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with the only representative from Salt Lake Hardware
who visited the store in Picabo, Idaho, a party by the
name of Jim Nichols, he was not brought in by plaintiff to testify that in the operation of the store there
was a partnership between Rolfe Griffiths and F. C.
Watterson. The fact is and the evidence in the record
demonstrates that there was no such partnership.
In connection with the competent and legally admissible evidence to establish the existence of a partnership, Section 14-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
"In determining whether a partnership exists
these rules shall apply:
( 1) Except as provided by section 48-1-13, per-

sons who are not partners as to each other
are not partners as to third persons.

( 2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy
by entireties, joint property, common property, or part ownership, does not of itself
establish a partnership, whether such coowners do or <lo not share any profits made
by the use of the property.
( 3) The sharing of gross returns does not of
itself establish a partnership, whether or
not the persons sharing them have a joint
or common right or interest in any property
from which the returns are derived.

(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the
profits of a business ~s prima f ~cie evidence
that he is a partner m the busmess, but no
such inference shall be drawn if such profits
were received in payment:
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(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise.
( b) As wages of an employee or rent to a
landlord.
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner.
(d) As interest on a loan, though the
amounts of payment vary with the
profits of the business.
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the
good will of a business or other property by installments or otherwise.
The exceptions referred to in Section 48-1-13 deal with
a partnership by estoppel and are not applicable in
this case because such a partnership was neither pleaded
nor proved as required.
Mutual assent is necessary to a partnership. See
68 C.J.S., Partnership, Section 8, page 412. An agreement to share profits is an essential element of the partnership relationship. See 68 C.J.S., Partnership, Section 17, page 427. As to the sharing of both profits and
losses, it is set forth at page 431, in C.J.S., Partnership,
Section 19, that:
" . . . an indispensable essential of the relationship, although not necessarily by express
provision, is a mutual undertaking of the parties to share in both the profits of the business
and the burden of making good the losses . . . .
The absence of such a community of interest
in profits and losses indicates that no partnership ex is ts."
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The burden of proving the existence of a partnership
rests on the party having the affirmative of that issue.
The existence of a partnership will not be presumed.
The existence or non-existence of a partnership is not
to be established by the opinions or the belief of parties
to litigation or of their witnesses or by hearsay testimony.
In this case there was no mutual assent to a purported partnership between Rolfe Griffiths and F. C.
Watterson. They did not share in the profits or losses.
They denied that there was a partnership. There is no
competent or clear and convincing evidence in the record that there was such a partnership. To sustain the
Judgment in this case would be to enunciate a rule that
whenever a father-in-law aids and assists his daughter
and son-in-law and loans them money and other property, he thereby ipso facto becomes a partner with them.
This is not the law and certainly should not be the law.
To hold that such was the law would be a devastating
and shattering blow to any family relationship.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons eluciated herein, and, based on the
evidence in the record and the law applicable thereto,
the Judgment against F. C. Watterson, the father-inlaw of Rolfe Griffiths, should be reversed and J udgment entered in his favor.
Respectfully submitted,
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON
Attorney for defendanta ppellant
405 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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